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I. INTRODUCTION
When James Wilson composed his lectures on law in the early
1790s, Americans were not yet living in Charles Taylor's secular
age, a time in which citizens in the Atlantic world could "engage
fully in politics without ever encountering God, that is, coming to a
point where the crucial importance of the God of Abraham for this
whole enterprise is brought home forcefully and unmistakably."
Wilson was writing nearly a century before Friedrich Nietzsche
first declared, through the mouth of a madman, that God is dead.
Even then, the madman's announcement turned out to be prema-
ture, for as he realized, "[t]his tremendous event is still on its way,
wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men."2 The event still
on its way was not so much the death of God as the death of the
theological tradition that underpinned core liberal concepts we of-
ten take for granted, such as basic human dignity, natural rights,
* Professor of political science and director of the Kinder Institute on Constitutional
Democracy, University of Missouri. The author thanks Paul R. DeHart, J. Budziszewski,
Nathan Tiemeyer, Carli Conklin, Vanya Krieckhaus, Adam Seagrave, Joseph Postell and
Adam J. MacLeod for conversations and comments on previous drafts of this essay.
1. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 1 (2007).
2. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 120 (Bernard Williams ed., Josefine
Nauckhoff trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
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and moral agency grounded in free will. The classicist Kyle Harper
noted in a 2015 talk on these themes that the full realization of this
tremendous event "would unravel in future time, and its conse-
quences would be unsettling."3
Wilson, an Associate Justice on the first United States Supreme
Court and one of only six men to sign both the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the U.S. Constitution, seemed to understand the im-
plications this event would have, should it ever reach men's ears,
and he endeavored in his lectures at the College of Philadelphia to
shore up the theoretical foundations of American law. Though not
an original thinker, Wilson did labor to consolidate and preserve
the tradition of Anglo-American jurisprudence, and adapt that tra-
dition to the new circumstances in the post-revolutionary United
States. He wanted, his biographers have noted, to be the American
Blackstone, and, like Blackstone, he located the basic concepts of
the law within a broader theological framework.4 In this essay, I
revisit the moral anthropology of Wilson's Lectures on Law, which
offers a window into the theoretical foundations of one major strand
of American jurisprudence associated with the perennial natural-
law tradition. That strand of jurisprudence provided an account of
law that took very seriously the claims of both truth and reason.5
Before we consider-as we are in this symposium-whether "these
bones shall live," it is worth first recalling how they came to the
valley of dry bones and what they looked like when they were alive.6
3. Kyle Harper, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: The Long View," Lecture at the
Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy, University of Missouri (Feb. 19, 2015); see
also Kyle Harper, Christianity and the Roots of Human Dignity in Late Antiquity, in 1
CHRISTIANITY AND FREEDOM 123-48 (Timothy Samuel Shah & Allen D. Hertzke eds., 2016).
4. See generally 1 JAMES WILSON, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, at xiv,
xxiv (Mark David Hall & Kermit L. Hall eds., 2007). In his preface to the volume, Kermit
Hall notes Wilson's lectures on law were "intended to make him the American equivalent of
Sir Edward Blackstone, the great English legal commentator" and that his "ambition was
entirely in keeping with his goal of becoming the American Blackstone." Wilson was, how-
ever, quite critical of Blackstone precisely where he thought Blackstone's philosophy and
theology might inadvertently imply the modern view that sovereignty is merely about power
divorced from considerations of transcendent goodness - something discussed later in this
essay.
5. See generally James R. Stoner, Common Law and the Law of Reason, in
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 284-88 (Adam J. MacLeod & Robert L. McFarland eds., 2017) (explain-
ing common law, natural law, and natural theology are separate but related concepts).
6. The title of the symposium - "Resurrecting Truth in American Law and Public Dis-
course: Shall These Bones Live?" - is an allusion to Ezekiel 37:5, where the Hebrew prophet
Ezekiel has a vision of standing in a valley of dry bones. Yahweh then asks Ezekiel whether
these bones can live. The prophet's uncertain answer is, "0 Lord GOD, you know."
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II. LOSING SIGHT OF THE PRIMARY THINGS
Hadley Arkes, an emeritus professor of jurisprudence who now
directs the James Wilson Institute for Natural Rights and the
American Founding, once observed that it "has taken generations
of lawyers to make obscure and to forget the most obvious things
around us - or within us."7 From a different angle, however, we
might say the framing assumptions of our public culture no longer
give an adequate account of the primary things we see around us
and within us, leaving us uncertain and anxious about what to do
with this tension. The primary things I have in mind are basic and
foundational: the value of individuals, the human capacity for
choice, the reliability of reason, and the reality of goodness. This is
not an exhaustive list, but these are the kinds of taken-for-granted
concepts that the reductive materialistic assumptions of our secular
age routinely call into question.
One example of the discrepancy between the framing assump-
tions of our age and a concept we take for granted was provided by
a recent story in The Atlantic entitled, "There's No Such Thing as
Free Will." 8 Philosophers and theologians, of course, have debated
the question of free will for millennia. What was new was the con-
fidence with which the article pronounced that neuroscience had
settled the debate. Chemistry and physics, according to the author,
can explain every thought, every hope, and every dream (and this
would of course include our thoughts about determinism, or free
will, or anything else). This is an old assertion, purportedly sup-
ported by new evidence from neuroscience, and the implications are
indeed unsettling, for it would make freedom and moral responsi-
bility illusory. As a character in C.S. Lewis' That Hideous Strength
contends, after thinking this through, such a state of affairs would
mean that "[s]ocial relations are chemical relations."9 On this view,
politics and law are, and can only be, applied chemistry. One im-
plication is that the analytic distinction between freedom and tyr-
anny, consent and coercion, persuasion and propaganda, and ulti-
mately sanity and insanity, begins to break down.
These dire implications do not necessarily make the view false;
Nietzsche might have been right when he asserted that free will is
7. HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING TRUTHS 78 (2010).
8. Stephen Cave, There's No Such Thing as Free Will, ATLANTIC (June 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-
will/480750/.
9. C.S. LEWIS, THAT HIDEOUS STRENGTH 252 (HarperOne ed. 2003).
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the "foulest of all theologians' artifices."10 Indeed, it could be the
case that the foundational beliefs of civilization are all illusory -
that the truth is a poison pill that eventually will lead to our ruin.
Perhaps, to borrow that famous line from the movie A Few Good
Men, we simply cannot handle the truth. The really interesting
part of the Atlantic article pronouncing that free will does not exist,
then, was its subtitle: "But we're better off believing in it anyway.""
Within a discussion of philosopher Saul Smilansky's contention
that we should embrace the illusion, the article explains (perhaps
with a sense of irony), "if the choice is between the true and the
good, then for the sake of society, the true must go." 12
According to Smilansky, the truth is that there is an unbroken
chain of physical cause and effect from which we cannot escape and
which determines all that is or will be; but belief in this truth of the
human condition is contrary to our good. The truth, as Smilansky
sees it, is contrary to our good, because it empties the world of pur-
pose and meaning, which provide the crucial motivation for individ-
uals to carry on the project of civilization. The cold reality, on this
view, is that the same physical laws that determine the course of
our lives, actions, and thoughts will lead eventually to our physical
entropy and decay. As that other philosopher, Jim Carrey, said re-
cently on the red carpet at an awards ceremony, "[w]e're going no-
where. It is a big pageant of nothing, rising out of nothing, and hap-
pening for no one."13 From this vantage point, moral nihilism seems
to be a reasonable conclusion as we look into the abyss of death, but
the author of the Atlantic article highlights the worry that the ni-
hilistic outgrowth of materialism will undermine the good of soci-
ety.
Setting aside whether the concept of good is meaningful in this
context, let us note that the problem was acknowledged in Western
theology and jurisprudence before neuroscientists began studying
the brain. Biblical commentators, for example, have long inter-
preted one of the consequences of the fall of man to be humanity's
tendency to elevate material reality as the ultimate or highest
source of meaning. As R.R. Reno writes in his recent commentary
on Genesis, synthesizing the insights of classical Jewish, Catholic,
10. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 499 (Wal-
ter Kaufmann ed., 1977).
11.Cave, supra note 8.
12. Id. (emphasis added).




and Protestant interpreters, "When the eye of the soul becomes car-
nal, taking the physical and finite as the measure of all things, the
testimony of creation awakens a sense of shame. We know ourselves
pursuing a futile life-project-even as we commit ourselves to its
futility." 1 4 Smilansky and others, of course, might see this tradition
as useful nonsense. Tabling that question, we can say that people
have long been aware of the disheartening implications of a
worldview that makes the physical and finite the measure of all
things, and it arguably is our deep longing for the infinite and im-
mortal that leads us to be disheartened.15
III. RETHINKING THE CONSTITUTION'S HIGHER-LAW
BACKGROUND
Alongside the conversation about free will, there has been a re-
lated debate going on for some years in the United States about
whether what Edward Corwin called the "higher law" background
of American constitutionalism is actually backed up by a higher
law, or whether natural law is just the foulest of all political theo-
rists' artifices.16 Writing around the same time Corwin was teach-
ing at Princeton and leading the American Political Science Associ-
ation, Columbia University psychologist Edward Thorndike drew
out the full logic of the modern materialistic outlook, which poses a
unique challenge to the natural-law tradition. "The life of a dog or
a cat or a chicken . . . consists largely of and is determined by appe-
tites, cravings, desires and their gratification . . . So also does the
life of man, though the appetites and desires are more numerous,
subtle, and complicated."1 7 If Thorndike was right - if our lives are
determined entirely by our appetites, cravings, and desires - then
there seems no way for us to speak intelligibly about making
choices, or about being morally responsible for our actions in any
meaningful sense. Our lives and identities could then be reduced
to our biochemical composition, as we have already seen, and we
would at any moment be the obedient servants of our passions and
appetites, since it could not be otherwise. Reason, accordingly,
would not be the rightful ruler of our desires but would, as Hobbes
14. R.R. RENO, GENESIS 92 (Brazos Press 2010).
15. See, e.g., Sarah Beth V. Kitch, The Immovable Foundations of the Infinite and Im-
mortal: Tocqueville's Philosophical Anthropology, 60 Am. J. POL. SCI. 947-57 (2016) (making
a similar argument as an interpretation of Tocqueville).
16. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Liberty Fund 2008).
17. MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING To Do? 47 (2010) (citing
EDWARD THORNDIKE, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 43 (1940)).
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maintained, simply serve as "[s]couts and [s]pies" to "find the way
to the things [d]esired."18 This grim modern outlook makes its own
claim to truth, but the truth is human beings are not so special, and
human reason can never know or discern what are good or choice-
worthy or rightful ways of living.
Public discourse is impoverished by such an outlook, since the
purpose of debate about public affairs and the law could not be to
reason together about how we ought to live, but rather strategically
to negotiate the terms of our common life in a way that allows us to
satisfy our desires. This is the view Oliver Wendell Holmes seemed
to take in his famous 1918 Harvard Law Review article on natural
law, where he insisted that "[d]eep-seated preferences cannot be ar-
gued about" since reason does not disclose "what we should want to
want."19 Want is the foundation of human behavior, Holmes sug-
gested, and our wants do not take their orders from reason. When
we, like Holmes, dispense with the rational ought, however, the a-
rational will is all that remains. And if it is true that practical rea-
son can ever only be a foot soldier taking marching orders from ap-
petites and passions, then at the bottom of every argument is
simply a deep but rationally inscrutable preference. About this out-
look, we can say, at least, that it rejects root and branch the foun-
dational anthropology of American jurisprudence and undermines
the cogency of many basic legal concepts still scattered throughout
the law.
James Wilson's account of the law, grounded ultimately in theol-
ogy, exemplifies this foundational anthropology of American juris-
prudence. The very first line in his first substantive lecture begins
with the observation that "[o]rder, proportion, and fitness pervade
the universe. Around us, we see; within us, we feel; above us, we
admire a rule, from which a deviation cannot, or should not, or will
not be made."2 0 This rule that we admire applies to everything in
existence, including the "great and incomprehensible Author, and
Preserver, and Ruler of all things" - the God who "himself works
not without an eternal decree."21 With this beginning lecture, Wil-
son dives right into a complex philosophical and theological dispute
about the relationship between goodness and power that ultimately
traces back to Plato's Euthyphro. Wilson's answer to that question
18. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 45 (A. R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (in-
ternal punctuation omitted).
19. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40-44 (1918).




- that "from almighty power infinite goodness can never be dis-
joined"22 - is a direct critique of Blackstone's definition of law as a
"rule of action, which is prescribed by some superiour, and which
the inferiour is bound to obey."2 3 Wilson's insistence on the unity of
goodness and divine power provides a crucial underpinning for his
later accounts of natural law, the defining characteristics of sover-
eign power, and the legitimacy of rooting political obligation in the
consent of the governed. I will eventually return to these weighty
topics, but let me pause to note that Wilson's lectures begin by high-
lighting several important strands of thought from the perennial
natural-law tradition, which he understands to be woven into the
new constitutional and legal fabric of the young United States.
Knowing something about the broad contours of the natural-law
tradition, then, is an essential prerequisite to evaluating the signif-
icance of Wilson's lectures.
IV. THE PERENNIAL NATURAL-LAW TRADITION
At a basic level, the law of human nature is a standard of right
and wrong behavior that we know and that we can expect other
people to know as well. It is "law" because it imposes itself on us as
obligation, and it is "natural" because it belongs to that part of our
nature that is distinctively human, our reason. At times our moral
duties under the natural law will require us to suppress or redirect
our passions and appetites. To put it another way, the rational part
of our nature is the rightful ruler of those parts of our nature we
share with other organisms. As Aristotle noted, animals make
noises to communicate pleasure and pain, but human beings reason
with each other about what is just or unjust.2 4 As rational animals,
it is uniquely in the nature of human beings to reason about justice,
but in order to do so there must be something - some transcendent
standard or grounding of right - for us to reason about.
My own introduction to some of these ideas, like so many others
in the twentieth-century, came from reading C.S. Lewis' Mere
Christianity, the published version of a series of broadcast alks he
delivered for the BBC during World War II. Lewis, then teaching
English literature at Oxford's Magdalen College, had become a rec-
ognized public intellectual, and the BBC asked him to deliver a se-
22. Id. at 503.
23. Id. at 471.
24. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 5 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Batoche Books 1999).
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ries of talks reintroducing Britons to the basic tenets of Christian-
ity. 2 5 Rather than beginning with Christianity's core doctrines as
outlined in the ancient creeds of the church, however, Lewis began
his first talk by describing what he called the law of human nature.
Starting with our lived moral experiences, Lewis then pushed his
audience to consider the consequences of abandoning the idea that
such a transcendent standard does in fact exist. If there is no nat-
ural law, he insisted, "then all the things we said about the war
were nonsense. What was the sense in saying the enemy were in
the wrong unless Right is a real thing which the Nazis at bottom
knew as well as we did and ought to have practiced it?"26 Pivoting
from the reality of evil - as it was laid bare by Nazism's political
project - Lewis insisted that we also do not behave as we ought.
"None of us are really keeping the Law of Nature," Lewis concluded,
and these two facts-there is a law of nature and we do not keep
it-are, Lewis asserted, "the foundation of all clear thinking about
ourselves and the universe we live in."2 7
These seemed to me at the time - and still seem - to be some
pretty big claims with profound implications for political life. The
claims are also consistent with the way many people experience the
world. As Paul reflected on his own moral experience in his epistle
to the Romans, "I do not do the good I want to do, but the evil I do
not want to do - this I keep on doing." Later, he wrote, "Although I
want to do the good, evil is right there with me." 28 One does not
have to be a Christian to understand the experience Paul described
here. Lincoln once quipped in a debate that we would have discov-
ered that men are desperately selfish even without the Bible, and I
think we also would have discovered that we do not always do the
things we know we ought to do.29 This is a fact of the world as we
experience it. We long for righteousness and justice, but our world
is corrupt, because we are corrupt. Our experience of the world as
somehow less than what it ought to be is a fact of our existence, and
natural-law theory tries to make sense of the fact.
As a natural-law theorist, Lewis was, as Ayn Rand contended, "a
pick-pocket of concepts."30 His strength was not in originality but
25. See generally GEORGE M. MARSDEN, C.S. LEWIS'S "MERE CHRISTIANITY": A
BIOGRAPHY (Princeton Univ. Press 2016).
26. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 5 (HarperOne 2001).
27. Id. at 7-8.
28. Romans 7:15.
29. 3 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 310 (Roy P.
Basler ed., 1953).
30. AYN RAND, AYN RAND'S MARGINALIA: HER CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE WRITINGS OF
OVER 20 AUTHORS 92 (Robert Mayhew ed., 1995).
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rather in synthesizing and communicating a corpus of knowledge.
Lewis was well-versed in the classical theory of natural law, as it
had been developed by the ancient Greeks and Romans, and the
early Christians. The citations in his famous book The Abolition of
Man-listed as the seventh best book of the twentieth century by
National Review magazine31-include Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, Paul,
Augustine, Aquinas, and the 1 7 th Century Anglican theologian
Richard Hooker. As ecumenical as Lewis tried to be, he was in fact
aligning himself with a distinct tradition of thought. In his aca-
demic magnum opus, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century,
Lewis described the twists and turns of modern political philosophy
and theology, and wrote that with Hooker "the medieval conception
of Natural Law" had "reached its fullest and most beautiful expres-
sion."32 Hooker, in turn, is a connecting link from the classical nat-
ural-law tradition to many of the American founders uch as James
Wilson, who read Hooker and cited him approvingly.
Beginning with Aristotle, that tradition taught there is a pur-
poseful order to the world. Nature is imbued with purposes, and to
act in accordance with our nature means to act consistently with
the way we are designed to function. It is proper to human nature
to act according to reason, that is, for reason to guide our passions
and appetites to appropriate ends and objects. When reason rules,
it does so by identifying what is good according to our nature (i.e.,
the kind of thing we are and are designed to be) and pursuing it.
These, then, are the foundational questions of ethics: What kinds of
things are good? How do we attain these goods through our actions?
That some things are good, and that we ought to pursue what is
good in our day-to-day lives, is axiomatic. It is foundational to prac-
tical reason in the way that axioms are foundational to mathemat-
ics. This is what we mean by "self-evident." If you know what it
means to be parallel, then you will agree that parallel lines do not
touch. If you don't see it, however, I will not be able to prove it to
you. In the same way, ethics will rest on some very basic axioms
that are indemonstrable and underived. From those axioms we rea-
son about how to live well, but in order to see the axioms-to un-
derstand what is noble and just, as Aristotle says-we must first be
31. The Non-Fiction 100, NAT'L REV. (Mar. 3, 1999), http://www.nationalreview.com/ar-
ticles/21571/non-fiction- 100.




brought up in good habits, since vice mars our moral vision.33 Hap-
piness is the term Aristotle used to describe a life well lived, but we
cannot achieve happiness on our own. This is why Aristotle fa-
mously said that man is by nature a political animal - not because
we spontaneously engage in politics, but because living well as hu-
man beings requires that we live in political communities. A man
who can flourish on his own, Aristotle thought, would be either a
beast or a god.3 4
With Aristotle, we are not yet at the natural-law tradition, but
we are close. Other theorists soon identified the principles that lead
to human happiness with law. As the Roman statesman and phi-
losopher Cicero wrote, in the voice of Laelius, "[t]here is a true law,
a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable,
eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions
restrain us from evil." 3 5 There is nothing distinctly Christian about
what the ancient tradition taught, but many Christians have
thought it was for the most part correct: our universe is imbued
with purposes; human beings should act according to reason; we are
by nature political animals; these principles do impose themselves
on us as law. Christians, however, have qualified or at least em-
phasized a few things about the ancient tradition. First, the natu-
ral law has a law giver. It is the product of the mind of God, part of
the divine reason, or what Aquinas, Hooker, and James Wilson each
called the eternal law. Second, law is an ordinance of reason made
for the common good by someone with authority, and it is made
known to those who are morally obligated to obey.36 Natural law
fits this description. It is an ordinance of reason made by God for
the care of the human community and promulgated through the
deep structure of the human psyche. Human law, to be truly law
(and not simply an act of violence or coercion), must also fit this
description; it must be reasonable, made for the common good by
someone with authority to make law, and made known. If it is not,
then it is defective as law to the degree that it deviates from the
archetype.
33. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 6 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2000).
34. ARISTOTLE, supra note 24, at 6.
35. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, The Treatise on the Republic, in 1 THE POLITICAL WORKS
OF 1VIARCUS TULLIUS CICERO bk. 3, para. 36 (Francis Barnam trans., Edmund Spettigue 1841-
42), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-treatise-on-the-commonwealth--5.
36. See, e.g., 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, question 90, art. 4 (Fa-




V. NATURAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
These broad claims informed the Anglo-American legal tradition
and influenced the way the American founders thought about law.
To take just one example, consider the often-cited excerpt from
nineteen-year-old Alexander Hamilton's defense of the American
revolution against criticism from the royalist Episcopalian Bishop
Samuel Seabury. Drawing his argument largely from Blackstone's
Commentaries, the young Hamilton asserted:
Good and wise men, in all ages, have . . . supposed that the
deity, from the relations we stand in, to himself and to each
other, has constituted an eternal and immutable law, which is,
indispensably, obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any hu-
man institution whatever.
This is what is called the law of nature, 'which, being coeval
with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is, of course, supe-
rior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe,
in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are of any
validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid, de-
rive all their authority, mediately, or immediately, from this
original.' BLACKSTONE. 37
This was as true for the future Republicans as it was for the future
Federalists. It was Thomas Jefferson, after all, who in the first
draft of the Declaration of Independence appealed to the "laws of
nature & of nature's god" and affirmed the "sacred & undeniable"
truth that "all men are created equal" and "from that equal creation
they derive rights inherent & inalienable among which are the
preservation of life, & liberty, & the pursuit of happiness."38
Although he was not personally fond of Blackstone, whom he
later called a "honied" Tory,39 the first two paragraphs of the Dec-
laration of Independence echoed some of the major theoretical
themes in Blackstone's Commentaries. As Carli Conklin notes,
"Blackstone's discussion of the pursuit of happiness was both pre-
ceded by, and informed by, his discussion of the laws of nature and
37. 1 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 62-63 (Henry Cabot
Lodge ed., G. P. Putnam's Sons const. ed. 1904).
38. Thomas Jefferson, Rough Draft of the Declaration of Independence (1776), in
AMERICAN SOUL: THE CONTESTED LEGACY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 7 (Justin
Buckley Dyer ed., 2012).
39. Letter from Jefferson to Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), https://founders.archives.gov/docu-
ments/Jefferson/98-01-02-5912. For discussion and sources, see Carli Conklin, The Origins
of the Pursuit of Happiness, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 201 n.21 (2015).
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of nature's God."4 0 The various strands of the natural-law tradition
come together in Blackstone's pithy account of God's one paternal
precept: "that man should pursue his own true and substantial hap-
piness."4 1 James Wilson, following Blackstone, also insisted that
God's "will is graciously comprised in this one paternal precept -
Let man pursue his happiness and perfection."42 This comment
makes sense within the larger theological and philosophical frame-
work of Wilson's lectures. As noted above, Wilson began his first
lecture by observing the pervasive order, proportion, and fitness of
the universe. Everything, including God, is governed by law, Wil-
son insisted. The study of law, then, as a discipline, is the study of
an enduring and fundamental feature of the universe we live in.
For human beings, law presupposes freedom and the possibility
of choice governed by reason. In practical affairs, we "propose an
end," that is, a purpose, for our actions in light of some good we
want to attain. The "brute creation," by contrast, "act not from de-
sign."4 3 Animals are still governed by law, but the law that governs
them is sub-rational. Human beings, still subject to sub-rational
appetites and passions, also exhibit the rational capacities that
make it possible to choose against appetite and passion for the sake
of a good discerned by reason. This is why natural-law thinkers
have so closely connected reason and law. The typology of law that
James Wilson develops makes the first classification of law either
divine or human. Under the heading of divine law, Wilson includes
the revealed law (i.e., Scripture); eternal law (i.e., law internal to
and governing God's character); laws of nature (i.e., laws governing
irrational and inanimate creation); law celestial (i.e., laws of angels
and spirits made just); and the natural law (i.e., the moral law
known to human beings by reason and the moral sense). The last
category of natural law is further subdivided into the law of nature
(when addressed to human beings as such) and the law of nations
(when addressed to societies of human beings as such). Human law
is what other natural-law theorists call positive law, or the law pos-
ited in a particular community, and it is further divided into the
40. Conklin, supra note 39, at 201 n.22; cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 28-43 (George Sharswood ed., 1893), http://oll.libertyfund.org/ti-
tles/blackstone-commentaries-on-the-laws-of-england-in-four-books-vol-1. Conklin notes
that Blackstone uses the phrase "the law of nature and the law of revelation" and later "the
law of nature, and the law of God."
41. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 41.
42. WILSON, supra note 4, at 523.
43. Id. at 468.
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municipal law (i.e., positive law within a single commonwealth) and
the voluntary law of nations (i.e., international positive law). 44
Natural law, in Wilson's schema, is truly law. It has an authori-
tative source, and it is known to us by reason and the moral sense.
The first principles of natural law are themselves "engraven by God
on the hearts of men" and "in this manner, [God] is the promulgator
as well as the author of the natural law." 4 5 Yet it is important to
recognize that the authority of the natural law does not come from
God's superior physical strength. Power, by itself, is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to establish legitimate authority; it must also be
connected with goodness. This is why Wilson begins his lecture on
natural law with an attack on theological voluntarism, or the theory
that God's authority derives from his superior strength. This is cru-
cial for Wilson, because there is an analogy between God's rule and
our own. Power, wisdom, and goodness, are united and inseparable
in the "incomprehensible Archetype."4 6 Both God's authority and
our obligation flow from this fact. God is powerful, yes. But He is
also wise and good, and the rules He promulgates are for our own
good. His one paternal precept can be reduced to the command that
we pursue our own happiness, because his commands are all de-
signed to direct us to our proper end, which is our happiness or
flourishing.
VI. AXIOMS AND THE MORAL SENSE
Within this broader discussion, asking whether we have good rea-
sons to obey God is akin to asking whether we are obliged to obey
God's one paternal command; must we pursue our own happiness?
Wilson offers an answer that shows his indebtedness to the school
of Scottish moral sense philosophy: "I can only say, I feel that such
is my duty. Here investigation must stop; reasoning can go no far-
ther."4 7 The term "feel" is equivocal here. Wilson's Scottish con-
temporaries such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid
debated whether moral obligations are known through the intellect
or through sentiment.4 8 Mark David Hall notes that Wilson re-
jected the school associated with Hume and Smith and followed the
school associated with Reid, which maintained the broader natural-
law tradition's tenet that human reason apprehends the moral law.
44. Id. at 497-98.
45. Id. at 470.
46. Id. at 503.
47. Id. at 508.




Reid, in particular, "contended that the first principles of morality
are known through common sense, which is a degree of reason."49
Interestingly, the Oxford English Dictionary includes as an entry
for the word "feel" a chiefly Scottish and now obsolete meaning that
indicates "mental perception or apprehension; understanding, com-
prehension; knowledge."5 0  This is foreign to how we often talk
about sense perception today, but "sense" and "feel" are equivocal
terms in their eighteenth-century usage that may indicate
knowledge held by the intellect rather than an emotion or senti-
ment. In context, what Reid and Wilson have in mind when they
talk about the moral sense is something very similar to what clas-
sical natural lawyers call the first principles of practical reason,
that is, the indemonstrable and underived axioms that are at the
foundation of every body of knowledge, including morality and law.
"The science of morals, as well as other sciences," Wilson insists, "is
founded on truths, that cannot be discovered or proved by reason-
ing."5 1 These truths provide the foundation for our reasoning, but
they are known intuitively. There can be no further demonstration
or proof, for on them demonstrations and proofs depend.
The point is that moral reasoning begins with an intuitive grasp
of basic moral categories. Those first principles might indeed be
very basic. Aquinas boiled down the first principle of practical rea-
son to the proposition that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil
is to be avoided."52 Blackstone and Wilson reduce the first precept
to pursuing our own happiness and perfection. Philosophers might
find subtle distinctions between these different ways of thinking
about the foundational axiom of practical reason, but both of these
formulas develop from the same tradition, and they both operate at
a high level of generality. Neither tells us what is good, or evil, or
what contributes to our happiness. Yet neither does the principle
of non-contradiction tell us the answer to any particular math prob-
lem. It is a principle that exists at a level of abstraction, but it is
one that is foundational to the entire enterprise that comes after.
If a person did not feel or intuit the basic moral categories, "it would
not be in the power of arguments, to give him any conception of
right and wrong. These terms would be to him equally unintelligi-
ble, as the term colour to one who was born and continued blind."53
49. Id. at 71.
50. Feel, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
51. WILSON, supra note 4, at 508.
52. AQUINAS, supra note 36, at question 94, art. 2.
53. WILSON, supra note 4, at 509.
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Moral ignorance might be theoretically possible, but it is empiri-
cally rare, according to Wilson. Languages, "not invented by phi-
losophers," testify to the universality of the moral sense, since every
language has words to denote right and wrong, praiseworthy, de-
testable, etc.5 4 This does not mean that every culture is equally
advanced in the science of morality, however. Appealing to Aristo-
tle explicitly, Wilson insists that to "ascertain moral principles, we
appeal not to the common sense of savages, but of men in their most
perfect state."5 5 According to Wilson, human beings gain, and de-
velop, human knowledge in three principal ways. First, they en-
counter and gain knowledge of moral reality through conscience
and the moral sense.5 6 Next, reason interrogates and corrects the
moral sense about the goodness of certain ends and the most pru-
dent means of achieving those ends in practice. Reason, he insists,
"contributes to ascertain the exactness, as to discover and correct
the mistakes, of the moral sense."5 7 The third, and final, source of
moral knowledge, according to Wilson, is Holy Writ, which refines
and exalts the moral knowledge known already through conscience
and reason. The writers of the Bible, as he notes, "generally pre-
suppose a knowledge of the principles of morality" and the Scrip-
tures are "addressed to rational and moral agents, capable of previ-
ously knowing the rights of man, and the tendencies of actions; of
approving what is good, and disapproving what is evil."5 8
VII. RETURNING TO THE PRIMARY THINGS
After this discussion, what then can we say about the law of na-
ture? According to Wilson, we can say that it is immutable, univer-
sal, and progressive. It is immutable because "it has its foundation
in the nature, constitution, and mutual relations of men and
things."5 9 It is universal because "having its foundation in the con-
stitution and the state of man, [it] has an essential fitness for all
mankind and binds them without distinction."6 0 Finally, it is pro-
gressive in that "morals are undoubtedly capable of being carried to
a much higher degree of excellence than the sciences, excellent as
they are."6 1 Even beyond its theological underpinnings, however,
54. Id. at 511.
55. Id. at 516.
56. Id. at 513-14.
57. Id. at 515.
58. Id. at 522.
59. Id. at 523.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 525.
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Wilson's natural-law theory presumes basic things about reality
that are contested and frequently denied. The first basic claim
about reality is that there is such a thing as the self. (Odd as it
sounds, some philosophers such as David Hume, and, more re-
cently, James Giles, do deny that the individual self exists, insisting
instead that personal identity is a fiction.) 62 Second, these individ-
uals have a rational nature. They are not simply a mass of tissue
or a lump of cells, and this matters. In John Quincy Adams' 1841
Amistad argument, for example, he distinguished between mer-
chandise and enslaved human beings, including "infant females,
with flesh, and blood, and nerves and sinews."6 3 He emphasized
their embodied nature to underscore their humanity, and he under-
scored their humanity to insist they were rational creatures who
were qualitatively different than merchandise - not that they were
merely, or only, or reducibly, flesh and blood, nerves and sinews.
Finally, practical reason discloses what is good for human beings,
or what kind of life is choice-worthy. Living well, or achieving this
good, requires all sorts of personal and communal virtues, and the
preeminent political virtue is justice.
Natural rights are an aspect of natural justice, but the founders'
natural rights theory is only a slice of a larger moral vision that
includes duties and virtues as well as rights. James Wilson's lec-
tures on law bring together these strands from the broader natural-
law tradition, and the lectures modify and apply that tradition to
the peculiar circumstances in the United States. Among the things
he retains from the classical tradition is a certain understanding of
human nature as somewhere between the nature of beasts and
gods. What makes human beings unique is that they can give and
understand reasons for action, and the language of practical reason
employs normative terms such as right and wrong, just and unjust.
Justice, in its classical definition, is the constant and perpetual will
to render to each his own right. All justice, in an important sense,
is social justice. The way we do acts of justice is by rendering to
others what is owed to them, what is their own right. Justice, then,
entails a relationship between individual duties and individual
rights. The objective duty and the subjective right are therefore two
sides of the same coin, and the same word can be used to describe
both; it is right for me to render to another what is his right. Wilson
62. JAMES GILES, No SELF TO BE FOUND: THE SEARCH FOR PERSONAL IDENTITY 1 (Univ.
Press of America 1997).
63. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, United States. v. Libellants of the Schooner
Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841), http://avalon.law.yale.edull9th centuryamistad002.asp_ (ar-
gument by John Quincy Adams on Feb. 24, 1841).
64 Vol. 56
Foundations of Law
thus does not take the modern path, cut by Hobbes and others, that
begins with individual rights unbounded by morality, leads quickly
to a war of all against all, and then prompts men to construct min-
imal duties designed to maintain peace.6 4
One implication of this otherwise academic discussion is that nat-
ural rights and duties are in harmony, and deciding what justice
requires in any particular case demands individual judgment. Be-
cause justice is rationally scrutable, our judgment about what jus-
tice requires is a rational judgment, even if it is informed, at the
root, by an axiom known to the morally mature individual by intu-
ition. Another implication is that there is a qualitative difference
between human beings and what James Madison in Federalist no.
54 calls the "irrational creation."65 In contrast to domesticated an-
imals, whom we rule rightfully for their own good without asking
their permission, it is an injustice to govern a rational being without
his consent. This is because human beings are naturally equal in
the very limited sense that no one has a right by nature to rule an-
other. Parents, of course, do rule children without their consent,
but the goal of that relationship is the maturation of the child into
an independent rational adult. There is a natural inequality be-
tween parent and child, but as James Stoner has explained, "Pre-
cisely what [the American revolutionaries] objected to in Tory polit-
ical theory was political patriarchalism, the effort to form the state
on analogy to the family. Natural equality meant that the king was
not to act as father in relation to his people-not that fathers were
not kings in their own homes."6 6
The family has, of course, largely been reconceived along liberal
lines, but even now we do recognize a difference between the au-
thority of a parent over a child, on the one hand, and the authority
of one rational adult over another. Take the television show Lost
as an example. Airing first in 2004, the hit ABC drama began in its
pilot episode with a commercial jet liner crashing on an apparently
deserted island in the South Pacific Ocean. The survivors quickly
had to confront, through practical action, some of the core questions
of political theory: who should rule, on what basis, and for what
ends? The answer is intuitively different for parents and children,
on the one hand, and free and equal adults, on the other. The an-
swer James Wilson and most of the founders would have given to
64. Justin Dyer, Natural Justice and the Amistad, STARTING POINTS J. (Aug. 28,
2017), http://startingpointsjournal.com/natural-justice-amistad/.
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
66. James R. Stoner, Is There a Political Philosophy in the Declaration of Independence?,
40 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 7 (2005).
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this question as it applies to free and equal adults is: we do, to-
gether, by mutual consent for the common good. But consent is
bounded by moral limits; we must not consent o irrational or mor-
ally vicious things, and legitimate consent presumes some rational
understanding of our own good.
Our own good is comprised of a right ordering of multiple goods,
each of which is self-evidently good and intrinsically choice-worthy
to the morally mature individual. Wilson does not attempt an ex-
haustive list, but these basic good things include life, knowledge,
religion, and friendship. The aim of rationally ordering our lives
around these goods is to flourish as human beings, that is, to be
happy. Happiness is not whatever we happen to desire or will, how-
ever. We can be mistaken about what will make us happy, and we
often are led astray by those worse angels of our nature. Natural
rights therefore take their bearings from what leads to our flourish-
ing by nature. It is thus intelligible both to think about individuals
having natural rights, and to include among these rights the right
to pursue happiness. The things we have a right to are things that
are good for ourselves and others. As Lincoln would later say, there
is no "right to do wrong."67 This, of course, does not mean that every
wrong must be criminalized or brought within the purview of the
state, but it does mean that the entire theory of natural rights rests
on a thick moral framework. When we come together to create and
consent to a government, we do so for the ultimate purpose of living
well. Justice is simply one prerequisite for our flourishing, but not
the whole of it.
VIII. THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LAW
This theory of natural law and natural rights-seen as mutually
compatible and working toward our individual and common good-
gives a coherent foundation to our system of law and governance.
As Paul DeHart has persuasively argued, the Constitution's provi-
sions and institutional arrangements (whatever the subjective in-
tentions of its drafters) seem to presuppose a classical theory of sov-
ereignty, the common good, and natural law and natural rights.6 8
At the bottom of all of this are certain axiomatic propositions, what
Alexander Hamilton described in the Federalist as "primary truths,
or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must de-
pend."6 9 Consider Hamilton's further elaboration of this concept:
67. LINCOLN, supra note 29, at 226.
68. PAUL R. DEHART, UNCOVERING THE CONSTITUTION'S MORAL DESIGN (2007).
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent o all re-
flection or combination, commands the assent of the mind.
Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from
some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the
influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of
this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is
greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one
another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right
angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these
other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an
effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned
to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with
its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power des-
tined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation.
And there are other truths in the two latter sciences which, if
they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such
direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and
so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of
common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and
unbiased mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost
equally irresistible.70
The problem that Hamilton identified, however, and that still be-
devils us today, is the tendency for self-interested passions and mal-
formed moral character to lead our practical reasoning astray. This
is what the political philosopher J. Budziszewski refers to as the
problem of moral self-deception.71 Our personal interests or pas-
sions may not often lead us to deny the abstract axioms of geometry,
although they might give us a personal incentive to deny the wrong-
ness of an activity we want to engage in or deny the implications of
empirical findings that cut against our preferred policy objectives.
In the realm of practical reason, our own vices and base passions
often pose obstacles that they do not pose for theoretical reason.
At a very foundational level, we might add the existence of truth
to the list of primary truths Hamilton identifies. There is no way
to deny that truth exists without falling into contradiction since the
statement there is no truth is a claim that it is true that there is no
truth. That, of course, is absurd, but seeing its absurdity relies on
70. Id.
71. J. BUDZISZEWSKI, THE LINE THROUGH THE HEART: NATURAL LAW AS FACT, THEORY,
AND SIGN OF CONTRADICTION (2011).
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other primary truths: of being (things exist), identity (things main-
tain identity through time), and non-contradiction (that things can-
not be and not be at the same time and in the same respect). In the
world of politics and ethics, there are other propositions with simi-
larly axiomatic qualities that all build upon these other primary
truths and introduce new ones. It is wrong to punish the innocent,
for example - an axiom that presumes we are moral agents who
choose courses of action for which we are morally responsible. The
category of innocence implies that individuals are not blameworthy
for things that they were powerless to effect. This is why deliber-
ately driving a car into a crowd to murder innocent bystanders is
qualitatively different than having a heart attack at the wheel and
accidentally driving into a group of people, even if the consequences
(in terms of damage to life and property) are the same. We hold
someone morally responsible for the first action, but not the second,
on the premise that human beings make choices, and these choices
are morally meaningful. As Arkes observes, "we cast judgments
only on those acts that take place in the domain of freedom, where
people are free to choose one course of action over another."7 2
This whole body of primary truths and moral axioms cannot be
proven or demonstrated. It simply has to be seen or apprehended
or (to use James Wilson's language) felt, which is another way of
saying we know the truth of these things prior to applied moral rea-
soning, and these truths in fact provide the foundation of our moral
reasoning. This is why the classic teachers of jurisprudence in our
tradition used the terms law of nature and law of reason inter-
changeably. Locke in the Second Treatise says simply, "reason,
which is that law .. ."73 This understanding both provides the moral
foundation of law and guides our interpretation of law. Written law
does not free us from the law of reason; the written law itself rests
on a mountain of moral assumptions, and at the base of that moun-
tain are the axioms of practical reason. In interpreting and apply-
ing written law, we will be forced to make interpretive choices that
depend at every turn on some conception of what is good or choice-
worthy or authoritative, and in our legal and moral disquisitions,
just like "disquisitions of every kind," as Hamilton reminds us,
72. HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING TRUTHS: THE
TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAW 52 (2010).
73. JOHN LOCKE, THE Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 2, § 6 (Thomas Hollis




there will be "certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which
all subsequent reasonings must depend."74
IX. RESURRECTING TRUTH
Returning now to the question that began our symposium: Shall
these bones live? Can we resurrect truth in American law and pub-
lic discourse? The practical question is what it would take for the
people who control the key institutions in our society to embrace the
old idea that the axioms of practical reason are objective rational
truths, and not merely the subjective byproducts of our bio-chemis-
try. In our modern world, there seem to be three main hurdles that
we must get over, as a society, before returning to the idea that
statements about what ought to be can be as true or false as what
is. The first is physical determinism. So long as our choices are
entirely determined by physical causes, freedom is an illusion. If
freedom is an illusion, then nothing is right or wrong, since una-
voidable necessity is not a moral category. Second, and relatedly,
is the general philosophy of materialistic evolutionism, which re-
duces all of reality to its material components and depicts life as
emerging from the blind and purposeless process of natural selec-
tion. (Note this philosophy is different than the biological theory of
evolution by natural selection, which is reconcilable with the larger
theological and jurisprudential natural-law tradition if it does not
already begin with the philosophical premise of reductive material-
ism.) Arguably, such a philosophy does not provide an adequate
account of why reason is reliable in the first place75 or even how
there can exist such things as minds, consciousness, values, and in-
tentions.76 Finally, theological voluntarism - which understands
moral norms to be derived from the arbitrary will and power of God
rather than the reason and goodness of God - denies the existence
of rationally-discernible moral truths just as much as determinism
or materialistic evolutionism.7 7
74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
75. See ALVIN PLANTINGA, WHERE THE CONFLICT REALLY LIES: SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND
NATURALISM (2011).
76. These are controversial assertions, of course, but see THE WANING OF MATERIALISM
(Robert C. Koons & George Bealer eds., 2010) and THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND COSMOS (2012).
77. This was the basic thesis of Pope Benedict's controversial 2006 address at the Uni-
versity of Regensburg titled "Faith, Reason, and the University - Memories and Reflections."





The stakes for how we answer these questions are high. In one
of his best and most reflective essays on this topic, C.S. Lewis ob-
served that:
[t]he very idea of freedom presupposes some objective moral
law which overarches rulers and ruled alike. Subjectivism
about values is eternally incompatible with democracy. We and
our rulers are of one kind only so long as we are subject to one
law. But if there is no Law of Nature, the ethos of any society
is the creation of its rulers, educators and conditioners; and
every creator stands above and outside his own creation.78
Lewis' observation does not mean the natural law exists (although
he of course thought it did). His narrower point is that the idea of
natural law is essential to the idea of freedom, because, as he wrote
elsewhere, it provides the foundation of "a rule which is not tyranny
or an obedience which is not slavery."79 In the modern world, some
have been tempted to dispense with the metaphysical baggage of
the natural-law tradition, but without metaphysics we are left
simply with physics, and physics is about power, leverage, and
force. If power is all there is, then everything is about power, in-
cluding the arguments we engage in as academics.
The alternative to reason is strength: it has always been the al-
ternative. In the reigning worldview of many intellectuals, mate-
rial nature in an endless chain of cause-and-effect necessitates all
human action. The strong rule, as must be the case, but strong can
also mean clever if cleverness helps one gain power. For this rea-
son, many academics see law and public discourse as little more
than linguistic power struggles, necessitated in advance by the
course of matter. It is a grim worldview that cannot give a coherent
account of many of the fundamental concepts at the base of our law
and politics, and cannot account for our actual lived experiences in
the world. "Everyone knows," as the late Peter Lawler wrote, "that
physics can't explain the physicist."8 0 Physics, by itself, simply ex-
plains away the physicist - and much else. The older theological
and metaphysical view gave us two basic things that so far we have
not been able to recover: a confidence in practical reason and a be-
78. C.S. LEWIS, The Poison of Subjectivism, in THE SEEING EYE 111 (Walter Hooper ed.,
1967).
79. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 74 (1943).
80. PETER AUGUSTINE LAWLER, Defending the Personal Logos Today, in REASON,
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lief in freedom. Both grew out of a deeper philosophical anthropol-
ogy that understood human beings as rational animals unique in
their capacity to deliberate about the standards of justice rooted in
human nature. We must recover that understanding, and a broader
worldview that makes it possible, if the bones of truth are to live on
in our politics and our law.

